The Concept of Fear and the Matter of Emotions in Lithuania’s Foreign Policy by Brunalas, Benas
197
L I T H U A N I A N  A N N U A L  S T R AT E G I C  R E V I E W 
2015-2016 Volume 14
Benas Brunalas*
Department of Political Science and Diplomacy, Vytautas Magnus University 
The Concept of Fear and the Matter of 
Emotions in Lithuania’s Foreign Policy 
This article reflects on the concept of fear in theories of international relations and foreign policy. The 
text discusses the concepts of the phenomenon of fear and rational behavior emphasizing that the 
concept of fear, contrary to the concept of anarchy, has no emotional charge in the theory of interna-
tional relations. Having surveyed the factor of emotions in the theory of international relations and 
foreign policy, the author suggests that the emotional meaningful charge be returned to the concept 
of fear.  The study stresses that fear (if treated as an emotion) can also have a destructive function 
disrupting the international system and disturbing the international communication. The third part 
of the article is devoted to an analysis of the ideas of Lithuania‘s foreign policy. The study explores 
the idea of Lithuania as a regional leader. The writer claims that the idea was irrational because it was 
based on the factor of the emotion of fear. 
Introduction 
In the theory of international relations, fear is an important factor assisting 
the explanation of the behavior of national states. Realists generally treat fear as a 
natural reaction to the anarchic system of international relations. It is believed that 
in the dangerous world order, reminiscent of the “jungle”, the fear of the Other 
can help to objectively assess the situation and, since fear is caused by reasons 
of the international system structure, shape a rational foreign policy of the state. 
In other words, fear is a stimulus for the rational and pragmatic behavior of the 
state. In the liberal perspective of international relations, the causes of fear are the 
dynamics of the change of identities. Fear emerges when the Other distances itself 
from “I” or ignores universal liberal values and seeks to revise the status quo. In this 
respect, the ideas of liberals are close to those of constructivists who treat fear as a 
tool for presenting to the public (securitization act) and solving (desecuritization 
act) problems of national security. In other words, for constructivists the fear of 
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the Other performs an important function of social building (construction of the 
identity) and social enabling (problem solving). 
These concepts of fear in each of the aforementioned theories are important 
constructs of the explanation and understanding of international processes on 
which both the identification of scientific problems and strategies of their solution 
depend. However, such definitions of concepts, when only the structural or iden-
tity-related nature is attributed to fear, have a price – the simplification of social 
reality and social processes. This, in its turn, poses the threat that the dynamics of 
social processes and forces driving it will not be revealed or assessed sufficiently 
accurately. For example, for realists the reasons of state fear will always be external 
(in the international structure) and always related to the increase in parameters 
of the originally poor state power. Therefore, fear for everyone and forever will 
be the same, independent of the subjective qualities of an international subject.
It is possible to observe that in the provided concepts of fear the emotional 
origins of the phenomenon of fear do not get revealed at all or only slightly. In 
other words, both realists and liberals use not the emotional (irrational), but 
the pragmatic (rational) concept of fear. In one and the other paradigm fear 
even possesses a peculiar positive function: to correctly assess the international 
environment (realism) or construct and expand (by excluding or involving 
menacing Others) identities (liberalism, constructivism).
In this study, the concept of fear is reflected upon by “returning” to it the 
irrational emotional charge. Such an emotionalization of fear is treated in this 
study as a heuristic tool helping to better understand and explain the influences 
of the phenomenon of fear (as an emotion) on international relations as well as 
processes of foreign policy shaping. The article states that fear is not necessarily 
of an external nature: the cause of the international system (the asymmetry of 
power) or the structure of the identity (the asymmetry of identities). Fear can 
also be a consequence of the articulated within a state belief system which iden-
tifies threats and fears rather due to the structural content of the belief system 
than the external reasons of the international environment.
1. Rational Behavior of the State  
in the Theory of International Relations 
Realism can deservedly be considered as one of the most important or 
even fundamental theories of international relations. The shaping of interna-
tional relations as an individual social science with its own object and methods 
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was based on the concept of realism. The scientific and philosophical influence 
of realism on foreign policy researches is also great. Realists, having criticized 
their predecessor idealists, urged an explanation of international behavior in 
terms of national interests, without taking into consideration moral attitudes 
and cherished hopes or attitudes and hopes of nations, which are inherent to 
the observers.1 Therefore, according to Hans Morgenthau, the aspiration of 
realists is to separate the truth from the opinion – that is everything that is 
objectively and rationally right and substantiated by data from what is only a 
subjective assessment not related to facts and inspired by prejudice as well as 
whimsical reasoning.2 Thus, a realist perceives the nature of the human being 
and the state such as it is and not as it should be and sees historical events the 
way they happened and not the way they had to happen.
In the theoretical perspective of realism, universal political constraints, 
determined by people’s egoism and absence of international government, are 
emphasized.3 Explanations of foreign policy are very important factors. Each 
state had to react to these universal circumstances at all times; therefore, we can 
speak about a certain conformity to the law and stimuli common and uniform 
for all states which, in essence, determine how a state will behave in the face of 
a threat. (For example: will it balance the threat, climb on the bandwagon of 
the threat, seek neutrality?4). Consequently, in his neorealistic concept, Kenneth 
Waltz concentrates the analytical attention on the structure of the international 
system. In order to understand behavior of individual states, it is necessary to 
first grasp the international system but not the peripeteia of the foreign policy 
of concrete states.
In prioritizing macro-level processes, neorealistic paradigms circumvent 
and pay no significant attention, in foreign policy research, to the elite of states, 
leaders and their qualities which can often be exceptionally rhetoric, emotional 
or personal. The most important is the anarchic international system, which, 
by “pressing” states, forces the consideration of survival as the primary goal of 
foreign policy. Thus, national interest is associated with the aspiration for state 
security and power in the anarchic environment of international relations. The 
attempt to ignore this reality (to ignore the origins of anarchy) is equal to the 
risk of being “punished” or even completely “destroyed” by systemic powers. It 
is in this logical generalization identifying a permanent threat that the concept 
1 Martin H., Smith S., Tarptautiniai santykiai: aiškinimas ir supratimas, Vilnius: Tyto alba, 1998, p.19.
2 Morgenthau H., Politika tarp valstybių: kova dėl galios ir taikos, Vilnius: Margi raštai, 2011.
3 Burchill, S., Linklater, A., Devetak, R., Donnelly, J., Paterson, M., Reus-Smit, C., True, J., eds., Theories of 
International Relations, 3rd edition, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 30.
4 Waltz K., Theory of International Politics, New York: Random House, 1979.
of realism‘s fear, as a rational stimulus, lies. Having acknowledged that the 
behavior of a state is only a consequence, whereas the anarchic international 
system is the cause, it is not worthwhile to question the rationality of fear or 
distrust of the Other. In other words, fear is a systemic (therefore, rational) 
phenomenon. Consequently, a great number of other stimuli characteristics of 
the social world – culture, historical memory, prevailing traditions, etc. – are 
ignored. This way, realists leave only a very limited space to objective behavior 
– i.e. having acknowledged the rationality of fear, to react to it by balancing 
power, bandwagoning or maintaining neutrality.
However, though the explanation of realists is truly rational, it is not 
realistic. It is rather possible to perceive the theory of realism of international 
relations due to its conceptual narrowness as the theory of topical realism. Gui-
ded by the strictly structural logic of reasoning as well as by generalities, realists 
of international relations attempt to squeeze reality into one scheme. In their 
opinion, we can know the states’ interests (real interests), as if the algorithms 
of the interests of a monolithic and predictable political subject, without having 
studied the history and culture of that state. According to them, the international 
environment is unidirectional, predictable and based on the same conformity to 
laws. This, correspondingly, limits the explanation potential. The historical time 
with the present rules, norms and values is current for the pragmatic attitude. 
Therefore, theoretical schemes, methodological dogmatism, attachment to one 
truth or one explanation in social sciences cannot to a measure reflect but rat-
her  squeeze reality in a procrustean way into the narrow frames of perception, 
homogenize and too much simplify the sources of human motivation.
 The theory of international relations proposed by Ned Lebow and 
based on ideal types, partly attempts to solve this problem.5 By claiming that 
conventional theories of international relations, by being orientated towards 
the structural and not procedural explanation, one cannot perceive the genui-
ne causes of social processes. Therefore, the author, by distinguishing in his 
theory ideal types of international culture, grants priority to process and not 
to structure, to changes but not to stability and thus seeks to concentrate on 
the analysis of dynamic processes causing changes of the international system. 
Lebow grounds his theory on the distinguishing of ideal structural types non-
existent, permitting not becoming attached to one universal stimulus (aspiration 
to power, aspiration to wealth, aspiration to honor); and on the other hand, 
creating possibilities to observe and assess structural changes (the dynamics of 
5 N. Lebow distinguishes ideal cultural types of the international system – reason, spirit, appetite and fear. 
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ideal types).6 This, in Lebow‘s words, enables to provide a non-moment-related 
explanation of international relations. In other words, the author emphasizes 
that it is possible to say much more about the international system than, for 
example, Waltz would believe. Moreover, Lebow reflects on the concept of fear 
(as a rational stimulus) defined by realists and separates it (as an emotion and 
as a factor destroying structures of international politics) from other stimuli. 
Taking all this into consideration, research on the phenomenon of fear is further 
surveyed and sources of generating fear as an emotion are analyzed.
2. The Destructive Concept of the Emotion of Fear
During the past decade, scientists, assessing the impact of emotions on the 
processes of the international politics, adhere to the position that the ontology of 
the phenomenon of emotions cannot be reduced to psychology and physiology.7 
Ema Hutchison and Roland Bleiker in their article “Theorizing Emotions in World 
Politics” discuss the fundamental issue of the concept of emotions. The authors 
come to the conclusion that emotions are not only an individual phenomenon. 
Emotions also have a clear social charge; therefore, they require political (not 
only psychological or neurological) theorizing as well.8 The authors point out that 
emotions transcend the limits of physiology and psychology and can be treated 
as a social and normative phenomenon.9 Scientists state that what people feel 
and express through physiology as an emotion is a product of the clash betwe-
en social and cultural processes.10 The expression of fear, anger, trust, empathy 
largely depends on the cultural context which makes emotions meaningful and 
acceptable to society.11
In this context, Hutchison stresses that in the constructing of identity, 
emotions acquire a specific function – they act as a peculiar medium and a tool of 
community consolidation seeking to involve those members that have no direct 
link to events (for example, historic) important for a concrete community and 
its identity.12  Thus, due to the very appealing to feelings, emotions can become 
6 Lebow N. R., A Cultural Theory of International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
7 Mercer J., “Feeling Like a State: Social Emotion and Identity”, International Theory 6(3), 2014.
8 Hutchison E., Bleiker R., “Theorizing emotions in world politics”, International Theory, vol. 6(3), 2014,  
p. 497.
9 Ibidem, p. 504.
10 Ibidem, p. 505.
11 Ibidem, p. 504.
12 Hutchison E., “Trauma and the Politics of Emotions: Constituting Identity, Security and Community 
after the Bali Bombing”, International Relations 24/1, 2010.
the most important force making individuals and communities identify with 
something or even die for something. For example, in times of social unrest, 
revolutions, wars and catastrophes, individuals or communities can suddenly 
identify themselves with hitherto alien, unfamiliar identities or, on the contrary, 
exclude identities that hitherto belonged to the category “We.”
The emotion of fear is one of the most important emotions identified in 
human behavior. It can be perceived in different ways. In some cases, the origin 
of fear is perceived as biological. For example, it is asserted that the human is 
naturally afraid of rapidly approaching objects. However, laboratory researches 
show that fear can be also acquired. The emotion of fear can be a phenomenon 
of social structures, i.e. a collective emotion well.
Contrary to neorealists, who perceive fear as an objective reaction to 
structural changes, Ulrich Beck provides a socio-cultural phenomenon of fear 
and emphasizes in his works that fear arises because of the subjective structure 
principle of a concrete society. The author‘s name for it is Risk Society.13 Beck 
points out that the mobility of time and space made the new risks (nuclear, eco-
logical, chemical, gene engineering risks) indefinite in time and space; therefore, 
it is difficult to explain them to society in compliance with the principles of guilt, 
causality or responsibility. In other words, Beck speaks about the emerging in 
society threats and fears solely because of the nature of the society structure and 
present in it cultural filters which affect and shape our perception.14
Barry Glassner15, Holger Molder16 call such an entrenchment of fear in 
social life the culture of fear which, in the opinion of the authors, has a great 
impact on decisions carried out in society. Molder emphasizes that in the culture 
of fear, the emotion of fear is predominant because of the constant sense of an 
unavoidable threat manifesting itself as the anxiety, insecurity, instability of a 
state (state societies, leaders). This prompts states to react to events sentimen-
tally, and emotionally, but not pragmatically. If this emotional charge of fear gets 
established in the international system, the area and scope of perceived threats 
can widely expand and really become a cultural element. In other words, fear 
becomes not so much a reaction to a specific (objective) threat but rather a part 
13 Beck U., Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity, London: Sage Publications, 1992.
14 Beck U., World at Risk, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008.
15 Glassner B., The Culture of Fear: Why Americans are Afraid of the Wrong Things, New York: Basic 
Books,1999; Engin F. Isin, “The Neurotic Citizen,” Citizenship Studies8, no. 3, 2004;  Konty M., Duell B., 
Joireman J., “Scared Selfish: A Culture of Fear’s Values in the Age of Terrorism,” The American Sociologist, 
vol. 35, no. 2, 2004; Rothe D., Muzzatti S., “Enemies Everywhere: Terrorism, Moral Panic, and U.S. Civil 
Society,” Critical Criminology, vol. 12, no. 3, 2004
16 Molder H., “Culture of Fear and Status Conflict in Estonia – Russia Relationship”, Paper for ECPR Joint 
Sessions in Mainz, 2013.
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of the perception of the social structure itself (fear becomes independent of the 
environment). This partly corresponds to the phenomenon of danger presented 
by David Campbell as an interpretation but not as a necessary and unavoidable 
reaction to a concrete problem.17
Having assessed this, it is important to keep in mind that the statement 
that the culture of fear is very closely related to the concept of anarchy, as pro-
vided in the studies of realists, should be treated with caution. In the opinion of 
the author of the article, the statement that the predominance of fear (or simply 
the predominance of the culture of fear) is characteristic of anarchy is not only 
inaccurate but also inconvenient in the heuristic sense. By stating that fear is 
a consequence of anarchy, we, on the one hand, oversimplify the fact of what 
anarchy is and how it functions and, on the other hand, we emotionalize the 
concept of anarchy itself. In this article, we maintain that in anarchy the culture 
of fear should not necessarily be a consequence of anarchy. Anarchy is a structure 
in which the culture of fear arises and dominates as a specific belief system due 
to other reasons independent of the logic of anarchy itself. The emotionalization 
of the concept of anarchy was observed to some extent by Buzan who claimed 
that the absence of power in the anarchic system is estimated negatively. This 
similar to poverty and diseases that are also defined as a lack of certain normal 
qualities (for example, order, hierarchy).18
Buzan proposes to simply perceive anarchy in terms of the absence of 
central power and to treat the concept itself as the description of the form of 
the security problem but not of the problem itself. A similar concept of anar-
chy is provided by Wendt who claims that the “logic of anarchy” per se does 
not exist.19 Wendt provides the classification of anarchy types (Hobbes, Locke 
and Kant) by explaining cases of the distribution of differing ideas and their 
internalization. With Hobbes’ anarchy culture in force, in the social structure, a 
collective picture of the Other as an enemy will predominate; therefore, states, 
in projecting their foreign policy, will orientate towards the worst variant (the 
theory of the worst case) and consequently states will tend to destroy or conquer 
hostile Others. In Locke‘s culture, a collective image of competitiveness, based 
on the acknowledgement of the sovereignty institute and the principle “live and 
let the Other live” will prevail. Kant’s culture, according to Wendt, arises from 
the belief that intentions of Others are also peaceful. It is possible to treat all 
17 Campbell D., Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, Manchester: Man-
chester University Press, 1992.
18 Buzan B., Žmonės, valstybės ir baimė: tarptautinio saugumo studijos po Šaltojo karo, Vilnius: Eugri-
mas, 1997, p. 196.
19 Wendt A., Tarptautinės politikos socialinė teorija. Vilnius: Eugrimas. 2005, p. 328.
these anarchy cultures, provided by the author, as social, psychological inter-
state relationship types, capable of forming systems possessing independent 
kinds of logic. Though in this respect all the described cultures are imaginary 
pictures and psychological interrelations, in Hobbes’ anarchy, because of the 
self-isolation of subjects and the articulation of the image of anarchy at the 
closed state level, a fear-saturated belief system will prevail – “destroy or you 
will be destroyed”. In other words, Hobbes’ anarchy, because of its form (the 
construction of the imagining of anarchy is going on with little or no interaction 
with the environment) as well as its content (the relationship of subjects is ba-
sed on conflict and denial of each other but not on cooperation), differs from 
Locke’s and Kant’s anarchies and thus can be considered a phenomenon of a 
completely different type. 
The existing differences between these anarchy cultures (particularly the 
difference of Hobbes’ anarchy from the anarchies of Locke and Kant) could be 
explained as the cause of the identity-related openness level of structure subjects 
characteristic of the anarchy culture. Theoretically, it is possible to imagine all 
identities on a straight line of openness and closedness. The more closed the 
identity the less dependent its identity code is on other identities and the less 
affected such an identity is by external processes. The marginal (maximal) case 
of identity-related closedness should be, in essence, a negative possibility of the 
existence of any other identity (thus, of the identity itself per se). Meanwhile, 
the more open the identity the more affected it is by external changes and the 
more dependent its identity code is on other identities. In case of the marginal 
(maximal) identity openness, the identity per se also disappears (because there 
is no longer any difference between I and the Other) however, the process itself 
of “identity vanishing”, contrary to what would go through the identity close-
dness, is positive – involving Others, but not negative – denying or destroying 
Others. Thus, perceiving that each identity has a different bent for closedness or 
openness (and, in fact, never arises on the basis of the mentioned limiting cases) 
it is reasonable to classify identity into the extrovert and introvert identities.
By considering this elementary sequence at the hypothetical level, we 
shall easily come to the conclusion that the ideal type of the closed identity will 
be much more stable than the ideal type of the open identity. In an ideal case 
of a completely introvert identity, the identity will be stable, resistant to iden-
tity-related shocks, which may destroy social identity aggregations. However, 
this type of stability is only feasible in case of the limiting identity closedness 
(when other identities do not longer exist). The closedness of identity in the 
structure where other identity subjects exist will always experience a greater 
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friction and external pressure than identities of the extrovert type, capable of 
both to faster get adjusted to changing conditions and to neutralize, through 
the integration of identities, possible identity-related frictions. It is possible to 
state that this is one of the essential reasons why Hobbesian anarchy grounded 
on identity introvertism is conflicting (therefore, unstable), whereas Lockean 
and Kantian anarchies, though at different levels, yet based on identity extro-
vertism, are peaceful and in terms of structure stable structures (see Figure 1). 
It is also worthwhile to claim that the place of identity on the straight line of 
openness and closedness is directly related to what fear and how the identity 
subject will feel. For example, in Locke‘s and Kant’s anarchies, fear concerning 
the extrovertism of identity should be directly dependent on external factors. 
Meanwhile, in Hobbes’ anarchy, fear will arise and will be sustained by excep-
tionally internal factors; therefore, in its form and content it will qualitatively 
differ from the previous two types (qualitative differences of fear in examples of 
introvert and extrovert identities are discussed in the second part). Thus, if fear 
can be rational (as a reaction to the objective reality) in extrovert anarchy types 
of Locke and Kant, in the introvert anarchy of Hobbes it emerges and develops 
rather as an emotion within the subject; therefore, it should be treated as an 
irrational phenomenon. This, in essence, is one of the most important factors 
linking the emotion of fear and identity.














From the point of view of the constructivist perspective, fear (as an emo-
tion) can also be treated as an obstacle of the international system (at the macro 
level) though possessing the function of maintaining stability and sustainability 
at the micro (the internal level of the state) level. For example, fear can unite 
a nation (particularly by escalating it in the public discourse) in the face of a 
national threat. This is related to the fact that the formation of the community 
can be perceived as an act, pushed by socio-psychological stimuli, in which 
the fear that Others, not belonging to the group, can and intend to harm the 
members of the group will dominate.20 Consequently, fear can be a stimulus to 
more clearly, more firmly and more rapidly define a collective identity. However, 
this domination of fear in the narrative of identity at the same time programs 
instability and irrational interaction of subjects at the international level, in 
which identities based on introvertism and fear will determine the emergence 
of a fear-based system. It is not accidentally that Lebow notes that in political 
and psychological literature the perception of the Other is an ideological (in 
this study, ideological would correspond to the statement that such a represen-
tation is formed subjectively within the state) rather than real representation.21 
Though the stimulus of fear can encourage cooperation, it is probable that this 
cooperation will only last as long as the very threat that started the cooperation. 
Therefore, Lebow presents the fear-based culture as a trap which is easy to get 
into but difficult to get out of.22
3. Concepts of the Perception  
of Threat as the Cause of Fear 
Having defined the concept of the emotion of fear as well as the impact 
of the culture of fear (the dominance of the emotion of fear) on social structu-
res, we should now characterize reasons for the emergence of fear. Taking into 
consideration the provided reasoning, it is logical to treat fear as a reaction to 
the perception of the emerged threat. Having integrated the attitudes of realists, 
liberals, constructivists as well as those dealing with the first level of analysis, 
based on the concepts of foreign policy research, we will further present in this 
study theoretical concepts of the perception of the emerged threat: threat as a 
20 Rousseau D. L., Garcia-Retameo R., “Identity, Power, and Threat Perception: A Cross National Experi-
mental Survey”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 4 (51), 2007, p. 744–771.
21 Lebow N. R., A Cultural Theory of International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008, p.488
22 Ibidem.  p.92.
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consequence of the power asymmetry, threat as a consequence of the identity 
asymmetry and threat as a consequence determined by the belief system. It is 
necessary to emphasize that the concepts of threat perception provided in the 
study are treated as differing, changing each other and interrelated schemes of 
the perception of the picture of the causes of threat (ideal types). Consequently, 
not a single model among the ones provided is treated as the general theory 
of the perception of threat. The invocation of all these concepts rather creates 
possibilities for all-around analysis of the impact of the fear factor on foreign 
policy formation and implementation.
3.1. Power Asymmetry 
The perception of fear based on power asymmetry partly coincides with 
the attitude of realists of international relations towards the causes of threat and 
fear. In this perspective of the explanation of international politics, the most 
important source of threat and fear is the formation and increase of power 
asymmetry in the anarchic system of international relations. For example, it 
was Thucydides who drew the conclusion that the cause of the war between 
Athens and Sparta was the created power asymmetry between the two poles and 
an increase in that asymmetry. In other words, power acquisition by any other 
subject of the international system is potentially threatening and dangerous. 
According to realists, this is a thesis calling for no discussion. According to the 
pioneers of realpolitik, Machiavelli and Hobbes, a human or a state will always 
have/must have a permanent aspiration to gain and develop power; it is a result 
programmed by the state of anarchy. 
Waltz integrated these statements into his scientific theory of internatio-
nal relations. Waltz claims that threat is a function of power asymmetry. If, for 
example, state X has more power than state Y, the fear of X is grounded because 
no one in the anarchic system can restrain Y from using force against X. Thus, 
to identify and perceive threat on the basis of Waltz’s neorealistic tradition is 
not very complicated: if it is feasible to easily measure power asymmetry among 
subjects of the system, then it will be equally simple to understand whether the 
threat is present or not.23 In short, it is sufficient to assess and compare mili-
tary, economic, political, geographic and demographic criteria. For example, 
the neighboring state X, in comparison with state Y has greater military, eco-
nomic and demographic resources at its disposal as well as great or increasing 
23 Waltz K., Theory of International Politics, New York: Random House, 1979.
political influence. It is natural that such a situation makes state Y estimate the 
power asymmetry as threatening. If state Y ignores this, as has already been 
mentioned, it risks to be punished by the systemic logic (conquered, annexed, 
etc.). So, fear that will arise as a reaction to threat, which emerged because of 
power asymmetry, will essentially be determined by material factors (greater 
military power, stronger and more rapidly growing economy, etc.). This would 
allow for the assumption that fear is a rational reaction. If the logic of the in-
ternational system is such as provided by Waltz, to fear (a stronger or getting 
stronger other subject) means to behave rationally, prudently and adequately 
to the actual conditions.
However, it is not completely agreed in the realistic perspective of inter-
national relations why a threat arises. Stephen Walt is one of the theoreticians 
that reflected on the logic of Waltz’s “calculation” of threat. According to Walt, 
threat is a function of 1) military power, 2) geographic proximity, 3) offensive 
capability, and 4) aggressive intentions.24 It is an important contribution to 
explaining the genesis of threat because it shows that states rather balance against 
threat and not against power. These factors, though retaining the perception of 
threat as the principle of the identification of power asymmetry, allow to slightly 
relax from strict structural reasoning and force to deeper consider analysis at 
the  levels of state, bureaucracy and an individual.
It should be emphasized that the perception of threat through power 
asymmetry should not necessarily be understood as the recognition of realists’ 
logic or its reiteration. Statements by realists concerning the concept of fear as 
power asymmetry are more important as reference points of the object of fear 
(power asymmetry) than those of fear ontology (aggressiveness of states and 
self-interest are inherent). So, if the factor of power asymmetry is not perceived 
as perpetuum mobile of the international structure, the calculation of power, 
depending on the situation, will simply be a natural and even rational reaction 
to the environment. However, if the principle of power asymmetry dominates 
and even becomes a part of identity, independently of the environment and 
its changes, one could speak about the power asymmetry method as the belief 
system. In other words, the concept of power asymmetry indicates that threat 
and fear are dynamic because of the orientation towards the behavior of the fear 
object (towards generation of power and its employment and partly towards 
threat balancing described by Walt) but not towards its origin. This is also related 
to the fact that the subject analyzed in the model of power asymmetry will have 
the identity inclined towards extrovertism whereas states presented by realists 
24 Walt S., The Origins of Alliances, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1987.
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(particularly the classical ones and partly Waltz) in this context would more 
often correspond to players of the introvert identity type. Consequently, threat 
perceived  by following the logic of power asymmetry may even contradict 
some realists who, by considering other states as inherent enemies, would rather 
conform to the structural aspects of the presented in this study belief system 
than to that of the asymmetry of powers.
3.2. Identity Asymmetry 
The perception of fear through the asymmetry of identities is based on the 
imagining of social reality by liberals and constructivists. If the social world in 
the concept of power asymmetry is in part “stable” (power redistribution is active 
and dynamic – the source of threat), having more or less clear compliance with 
the laws (preservation of sovereignty, principles of relative power and relative 
security), the concept of the asymmetry of identities points to a much more 
“active” social and values-related space grounded on the dynamics of identity 
change. Accordingly, this changes the way the origin of threat or fear is perceived.
Liberals’ perception of threat is related to the “encroachment” on the order 
based on the existing Western values (free market, democracy, human rights). 
In other words, according to this concept, fear arises because of the attempt to 
question the primatus of homo economicus. Liberals are convinced that it is these 
values that are the source of state’s power, prosperity and security. To put it anot-
her way, all have a possibility of and the right to power, prosperity, security and 
development.  Meanwhile, the ignoring of universal liberal values is associated 
with the contradiction to modernization and state prosperity. This is perfectly 
illustrated by the dualist theory of development which accentuates that poverty 
and political instability of underdeveloped states arise due to the incapability of 
these states to accept and implement a liberal mechanism of organizing the state. 
Thus, in perceiving threats, the most important factor for liberals is iden-
tity. If, for example, a state of democratic, liberal market starts arming itself (or 
otherwise changes the distribution of power), it will not necessarily be treated 
as a threat to a similar democratic state. In other words, for the identification 
of a revisionist state its very unrecognizability is important. If we are unable 
to attribute it to the category We, it is highly probable that political, economic 
and military ambitions of any state will be treated as a threat. On the other 
hand, liberals may also consider circumstances favorable for the emergence of 
a revisionist power as a threat. For example, threatening can be non-democratic 
regimes that seek or may seek in the future to gain more power.
Finally, liberals have a clear strategy for the neutralization of such 
threats. The panacea for neutralizing threats is world democratization and 
liberalization; in other words, universalization and homogenization of world 
identities (so, identity-related extrovertism is typical of this attitude). Michael 
J. Boyle illustrates this in his article claiming that the USA directly related the 
decision on the threat of terrorism after 9/11 attacks to the democratization 
of Iraq and Afghanistan.25 Thus, the existing or developing revisionist powers 
(the threatening Others) can be positively neutralized by involving through 
the liberalization and democratization of the Other. The more extrovert the 
identity-related I, the more intensive the neutralization of threats through the 
involvement will be. This significant aspect shows that in this model of threat 
concept there is no fixed, existential source of fear (see Figure 2). Threat and 
its level create a dynamic phenomenon directly dependent on the character of 
international and interstate relations. This thesis is, in essence, substantiated by 
David L. Rousseau who defends the statement that the level of identifying with 
the Other is negatively proportionate to the perception of threat.26
3.3. The Belief System
In the models of the concept of threat provided, threat perception and the 
intensity of threat perception are related to the dynamics of significant variables 
(power, identity). Thus, these models can be assessed as models responding to 
the international environment and the processes occurring within it. In other 
words, although threat has clearly defined causes, it does not have a fixed source 
that would itself be a cause of threat.
Threat here means: a constant feeling of threat can be simply programmed 
in reasoning and belief systems of social formations (for example, Beck’s Risk 
Society). An excellent example of such threat concept is provided in the study 
by Alastair Johnston where the author analyzes the role of memories (how state 
leaders remember certain events) in foreign policy. Johnston not only claims that 
preferences of societies of countries and their leaders can shape the foreign policy 
of the state, but also demonstrates that threats are an internal phenomenon rather 
than that of the structure (as would be explained by external constructivists, for 
25 Boyle M., “Between freedom and fear: Explaining the consensus on terrorism and democracy in US 
foreign policy”, International Politics Vol. 48, 2/3, 2011, p. 412–433.
26 Rousseau D., Identifying Threats and Threatining Identities: The Social Construction of Realism and Liber-
alism, Stanford University Press, 2006.
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example, Wendt).27 Having analyzed Chinese military texts, Johnston identified 
in his study an active, parallel, belief system which, being established in foreign 
policy discourses, has an impact on its shaping and implementation. The author 
named it the parabellum – a belief that it is necessary to get ready for war.
In the author’s opinion, the parabellum belief system is based on beliefs 
and stereotypes but not on the observation of the international environment 
(identification of power or identity asymmetries) that warfare is a constant 
element of human communication, that military capabilities are important in 
settling international problems as well as on the belief that conflict is always a 
zero-sum game (your win is my loss)28. Such a perception of threat essentially 
differs from both power and identity asymmetry models because threat does 
not depend (or slightly depends) on the environment and its changes.  In other 
words, contrary to the afore-mentioned models of the picture of fear, the belief 
system is based on identity introvertism.  Thus, beliefs and the process of esta-
blishing the belief system (emotionalization of memories and political events, 
historical analogies, stereotypization, etc.), according to Beck’s terminology, cre-
ate preconditions for the formation of society with a permanent sense of threat.
The formation of fear or a belief system of a different nature is also de-
pendent on the intensity of the communication of a state with other states. The 
more closed a society, the more its identity tends to introvertism (when in the 
construction of I, myself is not attached to significant Others), the higher pro-
bability that original, characteristic of only that particular state belief systems 
will be strong and influential in foreign policy. For example, in the Russian 
Federation, the mass media is highly dependent on the state, and the existen-
ce of the authorities themselves is based on the existence of a clear vertical. 
Accordingly, this provides possibilities to legitimize, at the state level, various 
myths, stereotypes which not only explain but also shape foreign policy of the 
country; for example, the belief in the hostile West, fascism of the Baltic States, 
the necessity of Russia as a world power and savior.
For belief systems grounded on fear, the external environment and pro-
cesses taking place in it are not particularly important. The external environment 
is subordinated to the model of the belief system and can simply perform the 
function of a convenient simulacrum. The formation of the belief system based 
on a sense of permanent threat depends more on dominating in the community-
biased beliefs and perceptions that distort the reality and a possibility to find a 
27 Jounston Alastair I., Cultural Realism, Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History, Princeton: 
PrincetonUniversity Press, 1995.
28 Ibidem.
rational solution to a threatening situation (for example, researches by Irving 
Janis and Leon Mann29, Richard Nibett and Lee Ross30). Robert Jervis accentuates 
that, contrary to what models of a rational solution would require, society does 
not renew information by assessing and perceiving the current situation, but 
often relies on the previously acquired experience and knowledge.31
Thus, the perception of threat in the belief system (for example, parabel-
lum) can be understood as a subjective, based on the introvert identity, and, 
therefore, a very biased environment reflection process where a lack of infor-
mation about the environment and its processes is compensated by personal, 
historical, emotional, cultural experience. In other words, in the reflection of 
the environment and Others, the I narrative (imagining oneself) is very distinct 
and influential. Consequently, in the concept of the belief system, the articulated 
causes of threat are more internal and directly related to the stereotypical models 
established in the subject’s identity and their emotional manifestation; therefore, 
the international environment (as the objective reality) has little potential to 
affect and change the level and intensity of threat.32 International changes and 
the dynamics of international processes are, in essence, important only in acti-
vating passive or creating new leitmotifs of belief systems (for example, fear of 
something) which are later constructed and sustained in an exclusively closed 
identity-related space of the state (see Figure 2).
29 Janis I., Mann, L., A psychological analysis of conflict, choice, and commitment. New York: Free Press, 
1977.
30 Nisbett R., Ross L., Human inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment, Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1980.
31 Jervis R., The Remaking of a Unipolar World, Washington Quarterly, Summer 2006.
32 Significant insights into the way of the formation of the belief system are also provided by the proponents 
of the line of the psychological trend explanation who claim that psychological bias is one of the essential 
factors determining the origin of threat perception and its escalation. For example, in the fundamental 
attribution failure concept, it is explained that when one person is observing another, the observer tends 
to interpret the behaviour of another person according to one’s own character, nature and deep-rooted 
motives. At the same time, the observer tends to think that one’s own behaviour is merely a reaction to 
the situation and the actions of the observed person and is in no way related to subjective implications 
of the character, nature or motives. This situation makes leaders and society justify themselves, treating 
themselves as less hostile, only reacting to the situation. Kelley H., Michaela J., “Attribution Theory and 
Research”, Annual Review of Psychology, vol. 31, 1980, p. 457-501. 
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Figure 2. Map of threat perception concepts
This is also one of the key causes that distinguish the belief system from 
other discussed dynamic models of power and identity asymmetry. The driving 
force of the belief system is that a strong introvert identity is not characteristic 
of either power or identity asymmetries. Therefore, it is the identification of 
the identity nature (introvert or extrovert) that makes it possible to determine 
whether in the construction of fear of a political subject belief systems or con-
crete asymmetry models prevail. In other words, the fear of power asymmetries 
or of a concrete identity can be the essential pillar of a concrete belief system; 
however, it is only in the introvert type identities that the mentioned fears will 
be perceived as consequences of the belief system. Thus, in this sense, individual 
ideas of both realism and liberalism or their predominance in introvert identity 
constructions can serve as building material for belief systems. Therefore, ide-
ological schemes (liberal or realistic) preserved in the identity and having no 
sufficient contact with social phenomena outside will tend to construct a sense 
of threat as irrational and, most probably, inadequate to the reality.  In general, it 
can be stated that these threat perception models are valuable in analyzing fore-
ign policy processes, particularly in the construction of goals, visions or foreign 
policy identities. For example, if the causes of fear are the belief system, then 
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there is a high probability that the culture of fear will subordinate the strategy 
of foreign policy which will be very inflexible, non-extensive and irresponsive 
to the environment as well as to material and non-material structural changes. 
If the causes of fear are the identity asymmetry, the intensity of fear will be 
directly proportionate to identity changes.
4. The Emotion of Fear in Lithuania’s Foreign Policy
Since the restoration of independence, it has been common practice in Li-
thuania’s foreign policy to distinguish stages in Lithuanian foreign policy. The first 
stage covers the period from the restoration of independence of Lithuania to the 
Euro-Atlantic membership in 2004 (Ieva Karpavičiūtė identifies a prior stage of the 
establishment of sovereignty in 1990-199433), the second stage from 2004 to 2009 
is presented as a stage of the articulation of ambitious visions, and the stage of the 
development of a pragmatic foreign policy that started in 2009. This periodization 
of the Lithuanian foreign policy is based on a different articulation of foreign policy 
visions which was determined by the process of seeking a national identity.
Nevertheless, in the current studies on the Lithuanian foreign policy, 
little attention was given to the stimuli which not only forced correction of the 
perception of the national identity (interpretation of I, We and the Other), but 
also filled the content of the proposed identity. In other words, the research 
carried out limited itself to a more traditional, sufficiently “passive” logic of 
constructivism by emphasizing the most important identity factors, and thus 
leaving aside the very process of the formation and implementation of ideas. 
Thus, although in the analysis of the Lithuanian foreign policy the significant 
identity-related “Others” are clearly identified and analyzed in detail, the natu-
re, dynamics and activity level of the interaction of these significant “Others” 
with the Lithuanian identity have not been clearly assessed. The present study 
proposes that the discussed problem be tackled by analyzing of the role of the 
emotion of fear (in the sense suggested in the study) based on the introvert 
identity in the articulation of the goals of the Lithuanian foreign policy.
The aforementioned aspiration of the vision of Lithuania as the regional 
leader was “to secure in diplomatic ways a safe and democratic development 
of the country in the view of new possibilities and threats through using good 
bilateral relations of Lithuania, the membership in NATO, the European Union 
33 Karpavičiūtė I., “Kaita ir nacionalinė tapatybė užsienio politikos studijose: Lietuvos atvejis”, Politikos 
mokslų almanachas 07/2013; 13(13). 
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and other international organizations, and strengthening Lithuania as a dynamic 
and respectable modern state”.34 The strategy of the implementation of this aspi-
ration was based on the ambition of Lithuania to assume the role of an attractive 
center of interregional cooperation, promoting Euro-Atlantic values, tolerance 
and the spirit of cooperation, uniting cultures and civilizations.35
However, in this narrative of foreign policy, the frequently emphasized re-
gional (particularly that of the East, Poland) dimension has not become a part of 
the Lithuanian identity. In other words, neither geography nor the identification 
of a concrete value-related space can be the basis of the constructed identity. 
This can be discerned when analyzing the concept of the role of Lithuania as 
the regional leader suggested by President Valdas Adamkus.
An active and leading course of the Lithuanian policy in the President’s 
state-of-the-nation addresses was first of all directly related to an active and 
not passive foreign policy. Seeking to attract Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and 
the Southern Caucasus closer to the EU and NATO, Adamkus urged Lithuania 
to form an ambitious agenda of foreign policy and become an attractive center 
of interregional cooperation, a link, a leader of the region, be full-fledged Eu-
ropeans and not remain on the periphery of Europe. Such implementation of 
foreign policy is presented by the President not only as a historic possibility, but 
also as a historic mission. Thus, Adamkus relates full-fledgedness of the state 
to its activeness; therefore, the existence on the periphery of Europe or being a 
golden province has an obviously negative connotation.
In President Valdas Adamkus’ annual report, historical, cultural and, 
eventually, identity commonality or identification with other “communities” are 
altogether excluded as factors which are important for the implementation of 
the goals of the Lithuanian foreign policy. In setting ambitious goals, Lithuania 
is not identified with “something” (for example, the region). Rather, it is stated 
that Lithuania should function as a center of interregional cooperation. In other 
words, there is no clear decision as to what Lithuania “belongs to” or should 
“belong to”: Lithuania is regarded as being in between something (the East and 
the West, the North and the South) but not somewhere (in the West, the North, 
or the East). Thus, despite the aspiration to actively participate in the region, the 
identity created by the Lithuanian foreign policy is rather introvert in its nature.
Therefore, Adamkus constructs the identity of “the regional center of 
attraction” the fundamental “details” (related to the identity, geography, and, 
34 Lietuvos politinių partijų susitarimas dėl pagrindinių užsienio politikos tikslų ir uždavinių 2004–2008 
metais, 2004 m. spalio 5 d.
35 Lietuvos politinių partijų susitarimas dėl pagrindinių užsienio politikos tikslų ir uždavinių 2004–2008 
metais, 2004 m. spalio 5 d.
partly, to values) of the narrative of which, as was noted by Gražina Miniotaitė, 
do not exist.36 Lithuania is seen as if in some vacuum, as “a crossroads of civi-
lizations”, having just a functional and a slightly mystical goal: to connect the 
East and the West, to be “a civilization key” that no one has so far been.
In Adamkus’ addresses, the President’s rather limited concept of a na-
tional state gets revealed and that (most likely) this is one of the key reasons 
why Lithuania is not perceived as part of the European Union. The identity of 
Lithuania as a regional leader suggests that there is a We (Lithuanians) and a 
They (Europeans). The EU policy is understood as the policy of the Other. There 
are no allusions to Lithuania’s European identity; Lithuania is “commited” to 
the European Union only in terms of values, but not politically.
Looking at this interpretation of this vision of the regional leader, one can 
see that the key principle of the created identity is striving for exceptionality, in-
dependence, functionality understood as the activeness of the country. Although 
in this concept, threatening motifs regarding the East and Russia can be found, 
they are not the main binding material of Lithuania as the regional center. Russia 
is not discarded as a potential partner, and Lithuania, by its active leadership-di-
rected activity, can help it “smooth the way to get involved in European processes 
of cooperation”.37 In general, both in the addresses by Lithuania’s Presidents and 
in the National Security Strategies (2005 and 2012), Russia does not feature as 
a clearly perceived threat; rather, it is defined as a state within the space causing 
certain concern because of its indefiniteness, unpredictability and otherness to the 
Western space (see Figure 2). In other words, Russia causes concern not because 
it is “a threat in itself “, but because it is in an indefinite space. In this phase of 
Lithuanian-Russian relations, the Lithuanian picture of Russia as a threat is not 
fixed. Threat, its level and intensity, depend on clear changes in reality: a threat 
can decrease, for example, under a positive change in the identity asymmetry 
(with Russia faster approaching a definite and friendly value-related structure) 
or under a positive change in the power asymmetry. Therefore, in the future, a 
constructive cooperation can be seen not only as feasible (with Russia having 
escaped from the threatening space), but also as desirable (for example, the reset 
policy emphasized in the Program of the 16th Government).
Nevertheless, in the created identity of Lithuania as a leader, the sense of 
fear is important, however, it arises not from the indefiniteness and otherness of 
the Other (of the East, Russia), but from the concern for the state and the nation 
not to remain on the periphery as well as the belief that only high political acti-
36 Miniotaitė G., “Europos normatyvinė galia” ir Lietuvos užsienio politika”, Politologija, 2006/3 (43).
37 Prezidento Valdo Adamkaus metinis pranešimas, 2005 m. 
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veness and state leadership is the condition for the prosperity of the state or even 
for its survival. In other words, the aspiration of the state to be a leader should 
be understood as an action taken because of fear to remain small, weak, unheard 
or removed from the center. Following this logic, it is fear and not geopolitics, 
geo-economics, or geo-culture that is the backbone of this foreign policy vision.
Therefore, on the basis of the previously presented explanation of the 
causes of fear, it can be stated that in the identity of the regional leader, the 
causes of fear are not power or identity asymmetries related to the environment 
response, but a subjective, independent and original belief system, created by 
the political elite of the state, subjectively idealizing the history of the country, 
suffering from a complex of possible inferiority of the country, small size or a 
possibility of passiveness.
When Dalia Grybauskaitė became President, the belief system of Lithuania 
as the regional leader constructed during Valdas Adamkus’ presidency was decons-
tructed. In her state-of-the-nation address 2012, D. Grybauskaitė points out that 
Lithuanian interests call for creative foreign policy and resourceful democracy. 
The most important elements of this direction include regional partnership, re-
gional solidarity, regional institutions, historical and geopolitical commonality of 
the Baltic States, the good experience of the Nordic States. Lithuania is perceived 
as a part of the international community, so the state is no longer in the identity 
vacuum, and the hardly perceptible historic mission is replaced by pragmatism 
(the need to more effectively function in the EU, a clear identity space).
Thus, the new stage of foreign policy that started with Grybauskaitė has no 
“fixed” threats and fears programmed in the narrative itself. Anxiety or threats 
in the newly constructed foreign policy identity are manifested rather by the 
principle of the identity asymmetry – fear is caused by a possibility to distance 
too much from the identity structures granting stability and prosperity – the 
European Union or the Nordic countries (this can be perceived as economic 
pragmatism). It is an action that is contrary to the previous leadership-based 
identity function because attempts are made to find identity ledges but not simply 
“jump” into the identity vacuum, imagining oneself as exceptional and special.
Pragmatic relations with Russia were possible because in the identity 
structure of the Lithuanian foreign policy, the narrative of Russia as a state in 
an unfriendly environment was prevailing. A positive transformation of Rus-
sia was imagined as feasible. Therefore, as early as 2001, with Russia’s growing 
economic, political and military power, or even having assessed certain actions 
of Russia’s aggression and revisionism (the  war with Georgia in 2008, Russia’s 
withdrawal in 2007 from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 
cyber and information attacks, energy blackmail,  the Russian National Security 
Strategy up to 2020 where the West is defined as hostile and dangerous), in offi-
cial discourses of the Lithuanian foreign policy and national security, Russia did 
not become an existential and inherent threat. As previously mentioned, in the 
Lithuanian National Security Strategies (2005, 2012) Government Programs and 
state-of-the-nation presidential addresses no direct military threat to Lithuania 
was identified. On the contrary, in the Program of the 16th Government it is 
urged to develop the Lithuanian–Russian relations without looking back—just 
resetting them. Even in the program of the Conservative Government that 
always had a stricter attitude towards Moscow, Russia is not regarded as a pro-
grammed revisionist state. As an exception may be considered the Strategy of 
the Deterrence of Russia that was released separately by the Homeland Union 
and which reflects the position of the party rather than that of the state (see 
Table 1 and Table 2).
Table 1. Definition of the Lithuanian-Russian relations  
in the Programs of the 15th and 16th Governments 
15th Government 16th  Government
Areas of cooperation
Economy, legal, political 
aspects
Economy
Level of the threat  
from Russia 
Low Nearly non-existent
Further development  
of relations






Closer, more rational 
(more pragmatic) relations
Table 2. Definition of the Lithuanian-Russian relations in the National Security 






• Enhance mutual trust in security areas
• Promote cooperation in economy, in the areas of transport 
  and nuclear energy
Lithuania’s goals
• Promote mutual trust and cooperation
• Support cooperation between NATO and Russia
• eek participation of the EU in Lithuanian–Russian relations
• Involve Kaliningrad in the processes of regional integration 
• Seek higher transparency and regulation of nuclear weapons 
  at Russia’s disposal 
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It is possible to state that such an approach to the threat of Russia was 
based on the identity asymmetry principle. In spite of occasional diplomatic 
and economic conflicts between Lithuania and Russia, the belief that positive 
changes in Russia were feasible, made fear itself directly dependent on the 
existing nature of the relations (fear is dynamic and exists outside). In other 
words, the prevalent belief was that Russia could be a part of the Western 
community; therefore, just for pragmatic considerations, it was worth coo-
perating with it. A perfect illustration of that is the fact that since 2001, the 
threatening of Russia’s increasing relative (political, economic, military) power 
on the basis of the power asymmetry failed to become dominant in the official 
foreign policy discourse.
Of course, the narrative of Russia as an eternal enemy of Lithuania and a 
major threat to its national security has existed since the very beginning of the 
declaration of independence of the country. Particularly, a part of the right-wing 
political elite of Lithuania suggested, most often in public discourses, that Russia 
should be looked upon as “the empire of the evil”, “a potential invader” or “a 
geopolitical competitor”. These suggested perceptions of Russia, most frequently 
very simple, consist of only a few identity criteria (mainly the Soviet experience 
and other historical grievances); therefore, they are very stable, resistant to chan-
ge and the influence of different social processes (culture, economics, religion, 
politics, etc). Yet, this portraying of threat often based on historical grievances 
and emotional experience has not, in essence, become the dominant position 
of the country (even, as has been mentioned, after the aggressive Russian policy 
towards Georgia in 2008). In both official and public discourses, this perspective 
was counterweighed by other perspectives of imagining Russia that suggested 
a more diverse perception of Russia’s identity structure. In most cases, these 
perceptions are complemented by the images of Russia as “an economic partner”, 
“Russia as a geographical neighbor”, which, in some sense, slowed down the 
maximization of the fear of Moscow, stereotypization as well as the transfer of 
it as an ideological leitmotif into the identity under construction.
Nevertheless, the occupation of Crimea in 2014 activates the aforemen-
tioned elements of the fear of Russia that existed in the narratives of Lithuania’s 
national security and foreign policy. Therefore, Russia’s revisionism, the ambition 
for the status of regional and global power not complying with international 
legal norms become an inseparable part of the picture of historical, current and 
future relations between Russia and Lithuania (the West). At the same time, the 
source of threat and fear is transferred from an abstract alien Eastern space to 
Russia itself as a specific political entity.
Changes in imagining Russia and the threat of Russia are taking place 
in both official and public discourses. Emotional epithets describing Russia 
abound in both media and officials’ speeches (President Grybauskaitė refers 
to Russia as “a terrorist state”, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Linkevičius com-
pared Russia to Nazi Germany), in Lithuania’s main news portals (in the news 
related to Russia) militaristic rhetoric, panic about Russia’s expansion to the 
Baltic States, the passiveness of the West are prevailing. The image of Russia 
as an unpredictable state dominates in the information messages of the public 
discourse. The country is often identified with the personality of V. Putin having 
psychological disorders. Russia is more and more often considered not only as 
a successor of the rights of the USSR, but also as a successor of its antagonistic 
policy carried out against the civilization of the West.
There are plenty of messages in which Russia is perceived as a cultural 
and economic barbarian that not only fails to meet the standards of Western 
values, but also contains a regressive social structure (and is seeking to impose 
it on others), uses economy as a political tool. One can even notice interesting 
value-related shifts regarding the entire Russian nation. If previously it was 
common to emphasize that it was the Russian authorities (the Kremlin) that 
were “destructive” but not the Russians themselves (the nation), after the occu-
pation of Crimea, in the Lithuanian media, when discussing the high ratings of 
Vladimir Putin’s popularity, more and more often odd suggestions to revise this 
perception were voiced, erasing the clear value-related line between “Putin” and 
“the Russian society” that hitherto had protected the latter. In other words, the 
Russian society is also becoming guilty and is identified and seen in the context 
of one symbol (bad Putin). Eventually, the image of Russia as a historical and 
inherent enemy of Lithuania (and the West) is born.
When comparing with the previously imagined Russia, the possibility of 
the change of Russia’s threat is rejected. Thus, the fear of Russia, the belief in the 
inevitability of conflict (sooner or later Russia is going to attack Lithuania) or in 
the conversion of Russia turns to be the essential principle of bilateral or multi-
lateral relations. Taking into consideration the previously presented reasoning, 
this can be treated as the belief system, based on the fear of Russia and close to 
the parabellum principle, which has been established in the Lithuanian foreign 
policy and which, because of its content (the issue of Russia becomes essential 
not only to the security of Lithuania but also to the existence of Lithuania in 
general), in the future can naturally become a leitmotif of the Lithuanian identity. 
One can already now notice that the parabellum narrative is gradually 
getting established and is replacing the created positive vision of Lithuania’s 
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foreign policy (integration, pragmatism, strategy) that had to bring Lithuania 
closer to Western standards by giving way to simply negative response to events 
(particularly those related to the Russian policy). The emotion of fear, just like 
in the concept of Lithuania as the regional leader, risks becoming the backbone 
of the vision of state foreign policy that can influence not only bilateral relations 
(between Lithuania and Russia) but also the imagining of Lithuania’s identity, 
its place and function in the region as well as the causes of international pro-
cesses. It can be noted that this concept differs from others by its exceptionally 
emotional performativeness. This, on the one hand, makes this vision intimate 
and attractive to the public space; on the other hand, emotional rhetorical 
forms, appealing not only to value-related feelings but also to societal psycho-
logy step up legitimization of the vision and its establishment in the discourse 
of the country’s foreign policy. In this context, it can be noted that the idea of 
Lithuania as the regional leader tightly correlates with the parabellum concept 
under discussion (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. Map of Lithuanian foreign policy visions
Of course, it is not completely accurate to claim that internal policy factors 
and emotions had the greatest impact on the development of the parabellum 
foreign policy narrative. To activate the parabellum belief system and establish 
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it in foreign policy discourses, external, regional processes played an essential 
role – e.g. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. It is possible to say that it was 
the dominance of the culture of fear in the Russian foreign policy discourse 
that was the main cause of the conflict (between Russia and Ukraine, between 
Russia and the West). In Russia’s official and public discourses, the belief in 
the exceptional mission of the state, a constant presence of a sense of fear for 
survival, striving for a status but not security38 subordinated Moscow’s foreign 
policy formation and implementation to emotional, fear-based belief schemes. 
Thus, Lithuania’s fear and concern about the aggression carried out by Russia 
are grounded; however, the escalation of fear through the parabellum reasoning 
code makes fear self-contained, autopoietic (self-generating) and little dependent 
on the further course of events.
Conclusions
The article discusses new perspectives on foreign policy analysis. The 
concept of destructive fear provided in the study reflects the concept of fear as a 
stimulus for rational behavior established in international relations and foreign 
policies. The article does not question the thesis of realists and liberals that fear 
is rational. Rather, it shows that fears can also be irrational, stereotype-based, 
subjective and disassociated from the environment beliefs and emotions (as 
manifestation practices). The most important criterion for “measuring” fear on 
the scale of rationality-irrationality is its interaction with the environment. In 
the case of fear as a rational stimulus, the object of fear is always on the outside 
and is caused by the Other. Consequently, the level of fear intensity is directly 
dependent on the outside and changes of the Other (the extrovert identity). 
Therefore, visions of a definite threat as power or identity asymmetry are an 
example of rational fear. Fear as a cause of the belief system is not rational and 
destructive in character since fear itself (though caused by a real object of fear) 
directly depends on the cognitive scheme articulated within the state (in the 
introvert identity). Thus, in this model, the state’s picture of fear is not, in essence, 
related to the object of fear and the international environment. Emotions in this 
model function as one of the key factors legitimizing the belief system; therefore, 
as the article claims, to perceive fear as an emotion means to derationalize the 
phenomenon of fear. The three concepts of fear based on different paradigms of 
38 Laurinavičius Č., Motieka E., Statkus N., Baltijos valstybių geopolitikos bruožai: XX amžius. Vilnius: 
Lietuvos istorijos instituto leidykla, 2005, p. 313-314.
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international relations distinguished in this study are not individual explanations 
of fear perception. Rather, they are ideal types of fear perception, changing and 
supplementing each other in reality. 
The analysis of Lithuanian foreign policy visions, based on the theoreti-
cal insights provided in the article, shows that after the occupation of Crimea 
in 2014, it is possible to speak about a newly developing stage of Lithuanian 
foreign policy – parabellum. It is defined in the study as the belief system based 
on the existential fear of Russia. Although the narrative of the threat of Russia 
has been featured in Lithuanian foreign policy since the very restoration of 
independence, it has never acquired an existential character in the official dis-
course. Even at the stages of the intensification of the perception of the threat 
of Russia, the object of threat (Russia) remained on the outside, i.e. the level 
of threat remained dependent on the dynamics of changes in Russia. Thus, the 
fear of Russia establishing itself in the Lithuanian discourse is of an emotional 
character. In its ideological structure, this newly begun stage is very close to 
the vision of Lithuania as the regional leader, where the articulated emotion of 
fear manifested itself as the fear to remain on the periphery.
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